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“Are traditional industrial partnerships so strategic for research spin-off development? 
Some evidence from the Italian case” 
 
 
Abstract: This paper aims to contribute to the literature on research spin-offs and strategic alliances. 
The research spin-off phenomenon has attracted significant attention in recent years. Yet research spin-offs 
might present a particular situation regarding their economic development. Therefore, the paper focuses on 
the relevance of traditional industrial partnerships and introduces a new and complementary approach for 
studying and analysing the role of alliances for this particular kind of firm. The results of a questionnaire 
investigation of Italian research spin-offs with and without a traditional industrial partner are investigated 
and supported by a linear regression model. Due to recent initiatives -a growing interest in the research spin-
off phenomenon - and the increasing number of established research spin-offs, Italy is a suitable case-study 
for such an investigation. Nonetheless, the results are generalizable beyond the Italian case. The findings 
demonstrate thought-provoking – and somehow unexpected – results regarding the role of traditional 
alliances in shaping the geographical and industrial environment as well as the performance, added value, 
age, and production process of the company. This calls for a broader perspective regarding industrial 
partnerships and research spin-offs: it reflects new modes of relations for these particular firms in the form of 
business ecosystems, either they are physical or digital. 
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Introduction 
In recent years, the research spin-off (SO) phenomenon has gained increasing attention and is 
considered to be one of the main tools for the exploitation of university research results. The literature on SO 
“has been growing in dispersed directions” (Gilsing et al., 2010, p. 12), and SO “remains a vaguely defined 
concept” (Bathelt et al., 2010, p. 520). This on the one hand constrains the analysis on this field, while on the 
other it motivates further investigation of several aspects surrounding this particular kind of firm.  
However, their recency and small size prevent SO from obtaining all the required talents. 
Consequently, these firms are expected to call for strong and intense partnerships, as hypothesized by 
existing industrial policies. R&D and entrepreneurship literature suggest industrial partnerships as one 
possible solution for enabling SO to compensate for weaknesses in key aspects of their development (e.g. 
management and business competencies, industrial productivity). In recent years Wright et al. (2004, 2007) 
highlighted potential advantages of a joint venture with an industrial partner. According to this study, the 
creation of a SO as a joint venture with an industrial partner could potentially solve problems associated with 
managing weak resources and/or inadequate capabilities. With a focus on joint venture spin-offs (JVSO)1, 
Wright et al. (2004; 2007) have been among the first contributors to the literature in this field and have 
emphasized the need for further investigation of the potential downsides2 of such collaborations. In a recent 
comparison between academic and non-academic high-tech start-ups, Colombo and Piva (2012) examined 
the effects of genetic firm characteristics and their effects on post-entry strategies in a comparison between 
academic and non-academic high-tech start-ups, taking into account the role of alliances. 
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether structural changes in ICT-related technological 
development, combined with the growing importance of new forms of industrial clusters, are indicative of an 
evolution in the nature of industrial partnerships and the ways in which they are used by SO.  
As highlighted by Hagedoorn et al. (2000, p. 568), “there is no uniformly accepted definition of 
partnership in the academic or technology policy literature”. Descriptions of traditional industrial 
partnerships extend beyond a mere producer-supplier relationship to suppose that partners cooperate in the 
development of common projects and reciprocally share knowledge for joint value creation. In this paper, we 
therefore use the broad terms “partnership”, “alliance”, and “cooperation” as synonyms, and we define them 
to be a formal, interorganizational, mutually beneficial agreement between two or more organisations that 
cooperate and join resources/knowledge/capabilities/interests in order to achieve specific goals (Yasuda, 
2005). Beyond this traditional perspective, particular kinds of firms like SO need more feasible and suitable 
relations, due to their strong scientific and technical knowledge background, and disruptive skills, supporting 
both tacit and codified knowledge. Therefore, they call for new types of partnerships. As a consequence, the 
issue of industrial partnership is of particular importance for SO because of their specific nature. Universities 
                                                 
1 According to Wright et al. (2004, p. 288) “A JVSO is a new venture in which technology is assigned or licensed into a 
new company that is jointly owned by the university and the industrial partner”. 
2 In particular, “We could caution, however, that a potential downside is the need to put mechanisms in place to control 
the joint venture partner and to select a partner with compatible objectives and expertise”, (Wright et al., 2007, p. 125 
and Wright et al., 2004, p. 308). 
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may have scientists with a comparative advantage in the invention of a new technology, but they may lack 
people with product development skills and business knowledge (Shane, 2004; Colombo, Piva, 2012). Such 
situations have led to gaps in finance and management competence as well as in the credibility of the market 
(Wright et al., 2007; Mustar et al., 2008). SO lack the market knowledge and business experience needed to 
transform their knowledge into a profitable product (Harrison, Leitch, 2010; Clarysse et al., 2011; Iacobucci 
et al., 2011). In combination with the poor performance usually observed in SO (Mustar et al., 2008; van 
Geenhuizen, Soetanto, 2009; Bathelt et al., 2010), these findings suggest that a learning process and/or a 
traditional industrial partnership (TIP) is a crucial element for both the survival and the growth of the SO. 
“When properly utilized, these strategic alliances can provide numerous advantages beyond operational 
efficiencies and effectiveness” (Kaasalainen et al., 2002, p. 209). 
Given these assumptions, we focused on SO with and without a traditional industrial partner and with 
and without a university ownership. We investigated the extent to which TIPs contribute to the economic 
success of SO by comparing the performance of SO with and without TIPs (SOwithTIP and SOwithoutTIP). 
We developed an empirical analysis arising from an original extended database created through the use of a 
questionnaire with Italian SO characteristics (e.g. history of creation, motivation, capital structure, location) 
and balance sheets. Our analysis reveals an inspiring and provocative finding: no significant differences exist 
between SO development and performance as long as they are embedded or not in TIPs. Such finding might 
partly be explained by the cultural differences and independence attitude of SO (Shane, 2004; O’Shea et al., 
2005; van Gelderen et al., 2005; D’Este, Perkmann, 2011). But the latter could hardly support such an 
unexpected finding compared to the existing literature. Rather, these results call for a reevaluation of the role 
of “traditional” industrial alliances for particular firms like SO. The reasons for which the development of 
SO displays similar figures with or without a traditional industrial partner lead to new explanations. In other 
words, a new vision of partnerships and innovative forms of contract need to be  conceived in order to 
support a process involving research-based firms, with specific characteristics and needs, and where partners 
emerge usually ex-post. We suggest that specific industrial partnerships may be conceived not in the 
traditional sense, but rather in the form of a set of industrial relations between SO. Such a strategy could 
therefore provide alternative assets and resources for development and performance, establishing an 
economic community involving many companies working together to gain comparative advantages as a 
result of their symbiotic relationships (Moore, 1993, 1996, 2006; Iansiti, Levien, 2004). This constitutes a 
virtual industrial cluster. Consequently, as suggested by Steiner (2002; 2004) in his reflections on the 
adoption of new technologies and cluster development, we argue that strategic partnerships of actual SO 
cannot be merely apprehended through the traditional perspective of relations with some identified industrial 
partners, but they must additionally be conceived through the structure and embeddedness in their business 
ecosystem. The concept of a business ecosystem has been developed in recent literature based on complexity 
and evolutionary economics and has been applied specifically within the digital field (Coralloet al., 2007). It 
draws an analogy between the biological ecosystem and a population of organisations. Competition, 
cooperation, and evolution are observable not only in nature but also in socio-economic systems (Peltoniemi, 
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2005). The growing interest of the concept is demonstrated by Moore (2006, p. 31): he recently argued that 
“markets, hierarchies and ecosystems are the three pillars of modern business thinking”.  
In order to analyse the characteristics of TIPs and their impact on SO performance, it sounded relevant 
to conduct a case-study of SO dynamics, examining hindrances and gaps in a specific country sharing similar 
institutional environment, geographical structuring and university framework. Due to recent initiatives - a 
growing interest in the SO phenomenon - and the increasing number of established SO, Italy emerged as a 
suitable case-study for such an investigation. First, Italian industrial districts (Garofoli, 1992, 2002; Becattini 
et al., 2003; Bertolini, Giovannetti, 2006; Hervàs-Oliver, Albors-Garrigòs, 2007; Parrilli, 2009; Camuffo, 
Grandinetti, 2011) and a fertile and industrialised context in the North (Nosella, Grimaldi, 2009) make Italy 
an interesting case in terms of variety of existing SO and potential distinctiveness. Additionally, several 
initiatives have been carried out in recent years in order to improve conditions that promote the 
establishment of SO (Mustar, Wright, 2010; Iacobucci et al., 2011). These initiatives include (i) the creation 
of SO regulations within many Italian universities following the Legislative Decree n. 297/1999 (Co-author3, 
2009), (ii) the creation of Technology Transfer Offices (TTOs) and Industrial Liaison Offices (ILOs) 
following the law 262/2004 (Nosella, Grimaldi, 2009), and (iii) increased attention devoted to science park 
and incubator structures. TTOs, ILOs and incubators are important for promoting the transfer of expertise 
and resources from the research world to the market one, even if available funds are limited (Iacobucci et al., 
2011). Italy hosts several universities4, a dense network of industrial firms, and a high level of scientific 
research (Breschi et al., 2008; Geuna, Rossi, 2011; Pezzoni et al., 2012). Furthermore, Italy has historically 
been characterised by a strong regional and innovation divide that is among the sharpest in the European 
Union (Iammarino et al., 2009) and may therefore support interesting comparisons between its regions.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 provides the theoretical background, including an 
overview of the SO phenomenon and a survey on the importance of a partner for SMEs: differences between 
traditional types of partnership and new types of industrial partnership in the form of business ecosystems 
are highlighted. Section 2 presents the methodology and the empirical analysis, in which we support our 
results with both a questionnaire and a regression model studying the existence of and comparisons between 
SOwithTIP and SOwithoutTIP. Finally, section 3 discusses the inspiring nature of our results and proposes 
explanations of such unexpected findings apparently contradictory with the current literature. Section 4 
highlights our conclusions. 
1. Theoretical framework 
Establishing industrial partnerships and/or calling upon external managers has been frequently 
proposed as a solution to bridge the gap between cultures, competencies, and attitudes of researchers and 
businesspeople: cf. Franklin et al., 2001; Lockett et al., 2003;Wright et al., 2004, 2007; Mustar et al., 2006. 
Despite strong academic backgrounds, SO face difficulties that are thought to arise from a lack of managerial 
                                                 
3 Author and co-author’s references have been cancelled in the reference list in order to keep it anonymous. 
4“Italy and France historically are considered the birth places of the university institution”, Daraio et al. (2011), p. 154. 
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and business competencies (Shane, 2004; Wright et al., 2007, 2004; Mustar et al., 2008; Harrison, Leitch, 
2010; Clarysse et al., 2011; Iacobucci et al., 2011). For this reason, a large part of the literature is focused on 
the structuring and distribution of knowledge resources in the SO organization and environment. This 
context involves also the role played by TIPs and highlights the potential role that could instead be played by 
new types of partnerships in the form of (digital) business ecosystems (BES). 
1.1 The research spin-off phenomenon in the literature 
Notwithstanding the great attention in the literature (Lockett et al., 2005; Mustar et al., 2006; Mustar 
et al., 2008), a precise and well-accepted definition of SO does not currently exist (Iacobucci et al., 2011). 
This has been recently confirmed by Muller (2010, p. 189): “when examining academic spin-offs, one comes 
across a wide variety of spin-off definitions throughout the literature” and by Bathelt et al. (2010, p. 522): 
“there is not a widely accepted definition”. The heterogeneity in SO definitions highlights the inherent 
complexity of the SO phenomenon. Yet, these peculiar firms share some common attributes that may help to 
provide an extensive framework for understanding their evolution.   
SO are broadly defined in the literature to be new firms created to develop knowledge, technology, 
and university research results for commercial use (Clarysse et al., 2002; Wright et al., 2004). According to 
Pirnay et al. (2003, p. 356) “spin-off” is a fuzzy and general concept that covers a wide variety of 
phenomena among which the USO [university spin-off] represents only one specific type. (...) In particular, 
a USO refers to a spin-off firm that is created from a particular type of “parent organization”, namely a 
university. Anyway, there have been many attempts to explicitly define a USO”.  
The following are among the most widely known and cited definitions and peculiarities of SO.  
Shane (2004, p. 4) “defines a university spin-off as a new company founded to exploit a piece of 
intellectual property created in an academic institution (...). Thus university spin-offs are a subset of all 
start-up companies created by the students and employees of academic institutions”.  
In recent years, studies on SO have adopted a narrower definition because of the difficulties involved 
in trying to identify the number of SO. For instance, Wright et al. (2007, p. 4) define university SO as “new 
ventures that are dependent upon licensing or assignment of an institution’s IP for initiation”. Nonetheless, 
given the reality of some universities in which IP is not necessarily owned by the university, and given the 
existence of many companies without formal, codified knowledge embodied in patents, the authors include 
in their definition “start-ups by faculty based in universities which do not involve formal assignment of the 
institution’s IP but which may draw on the individual’s own IP or knowledge” (Wright et al., 2007, p. 4). 
They exclude only those companies established by graduates. 
In a recent analysis on Italian SO, Iacobucci et al., (2011, p. 517) provided the following alternative 
definition: “academic spin-off means a company set up for the industrial development and economic 
exploitation of the results of research conducted in the PRI [public research institutions], according to the 
abovementioned regulations”. In comparison, Harrison and Leitch (2010, p. 1250) defined “formal” SO to be 
companies based on the exploitation of the intellectual property of a higher education institution, with and 
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without an equity involvement of this institution. Nonetheless, they also underlined the sharp increase in the 
number of companies initiated by UK graduates. 
Furthermore, in addition to the varied definitions found in the literature, the existence of SO and the 
collection of reliable official data on this phenomenon are both affected by institutional differences arising 
from, for example, the US Bayh Dole Act or the professor’s privilege in Sweden (Chapman et al., 2011; 
Farnstrand Damsgaard, Thursby, 2012). Drawing upon the resource-based view of the firm (Barney, 1991; 
Barney et al., 2001), Druilhe and Garnsey (2004) identified the essence of entrepreneurial activity to be the 
way in which academic entrepreneurs identify, select, and finally match up viable productive opportunities 
and resources. 
In summary, concrete difficulties prevent the determination of applicable criteria for identifying a firm 
as a SO.  At the core of this problem is the concept of “scientific knowledge”, even if no clear consensus 
exists in the literature regarding its definition (Niedergassel, Leker, 2011). As a consequence, we should aim 
to determine whether knowledge has been transferred from the parent institute to the firm, and if so, to 
examine the nature of this transfer. In this paper, we therefore define SO to be the set of firms established by 
current or former university/research centre members (e.g. professors, researchers, technical and 
administrative staff, and PhD candidates) for the purpose of exploiting research results, regardless of whether 
the firm holds a university share or patent. 
1.2 The importance of a traditional industrial partner for SMEs and new emerging 
perspectives for research spin-offs 
In high technology like in more traditional firms, the literature highlights benefits and advantages of 
alliance arrangements in particular for SMEs. The formation of strategic alliances is considered to be more 
and more pivotal for firms. It has been attributed to responses to rapid environmental changes, such as 
intensification of competition, acceleration of technology advancements, and enlargement of required 
investment and globalisation of the markets (Yasuda, 2005). According to Mohr and Spekman (1994, p. 
135), “partnerships are defined as purposive strategic relationships between independent firms who share 
compatible goals, strive for mutual benefit, and acknowledge a high level of mutual interdependence”. The 
formation of these partnerships aims at achieving goals that a firm alone could find difficult to achieve and at 
gaining competitive advantage in the marketplace. More than ten years ago Miles et al. (1999, p. 20) argued 
that “evidence suggests that [strategic alliances] are a reasonable choice” and Ingham and Mothe (1998, p. 
249) affirmed that “alliances are increasingly becoming a necessity for firms involved in technology”. 
“Coping with environmental conditions is particularly hard for small and medium sized enterprises that are 
operating in technology intensive industries” (Kaasalainen et al., 2002, p. 210). The most influential 
explanations for alliances are the resource-based theory (Barney, 1991; Barney et al., 2001) and the 
transaction-cost theory (Yasuda, 2005; de Faria et al., 2010): the former argues that alliances arise when 
firms need additional resources that cannot be purchased via market transactions, while the latter argues that 
firms form alliances if they can use them to reduce their transaction costs. The empirical analysis undertaken 
by Yasuda (2005) recognized that the primary motivations for alliances can be categorized as access to the 
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partner’s resources, shortening of the time to market or reduction of the cost, and the resource-based theory 
prevailed over the transaction-cost theory to explain strategic alliances in high-technology industries. 
The literature highlights potential advantages of alliances, but the overall impact of alliance use on 
firm performance is not well-defined. SMEs, in particular, call for technological partnerships more than 
business and managerial ones. A partner could be useful not only for filling the business knowledge gap, but 
also for market goals: more than twenty years ago Hamel et al. (1989, p. 133) argued that “it takes so much 
money to develop new products and to penetrate new markets that few companies can go it alone in every 
situation”. Nevertheless, even if the formation of alliances between firms is seen as a common way for 
achieving and maintaining competitive advantage, most part of such partnerships do not succeed (Chen, 
2004; de Man, Duysters, 2005; Lokshin et al., 2011). Yet, partnering relationships are accompanied by 
increased complexity, loss of autonomy and information asymmetry. Mohr and Spekman (1994) built and 
tested a model of partnership success addressing its main characteristics. Factors associated with partnership 
success are partnership attributes of commitment, coordination and trust, communication quality and 
participation, the importance of joint problem solving as a conflict resolution technique. Revilla et al. (2005) 
focused on communication, collaboration and integration as required elements for maximizing the synergy.  
These factors are significant but difficult to detect when we talk about SO characterized by a strong 
attitude at individualism (Shane, 2004; O’Shea et al., 2005), influenced by universities’ non-commercial 
cultures (Wright et al., 2004, 2007; Clarysse et al, 2011a) and considering that “academics and business 
people effectively speak different languages” (Wright et al., 2007, p. 189; Mustar et al, 2008, p. 76; Mustar, 
Wright, 2010, p. 52). In many cases these factors may result in tension and possible misunderstandings 
because of cultural differences (Samsom, Gurdon, 1993; Cyert, Goodman, 1997). In recent years Bjerregaard 
(2010) as well as Niedergassel and Leker (2011, p. 142-143) have argued "universities and companies have 
fundamentally different cultures and are perceived to have distinct social, cultural and economic roles…time 
horizons and the methods of validation and reward differ considerably…academic scientists perceive the 
short-term orientation of their industrial counterparts to be a major barrier for successful interaction”. 
Speaking of alliance and partnership call for considering the role and condition of “trust” between partners 
(Sherwood, Covin, 2008; Bruneel et al., 2010; Niedergassel, Leker, 2011), because SO hold “tacit 
knowledge” (Shane, 2004; Clarysse et al., 2011). The transfer of this difficult-to-codify kind of knowledge 
can enable an opportunistic behaviour of the receiving firm (Dutta, Weiss, 1997). Knowledge transfer 
between partners is difficult: “differences in corporate culture, processes and knowledge base may impede a 
smooth transition of knowledge” (de Man, Duysters, 2005, p. 1379). This problem of information asymmetry 
and the liability of newness have been highlighted by Wright et al. (2004). The tacit component of 
transferred knowledge and successful relationships building between different organizations, are also linked 
to the broad set of skills known as absorptive capacity. Zahra and George (2002) stressed the importance of 
absorptive capacity as a dynamic capability relating to knowledge creation and use. This dynamic capability 
influences and enhances a firm’s ability to gain and sustain a competitive advantage, thereby improving 
economic performance. In other words, this set of organizational routines and processes for acquiring, 
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assimilating, transforming and using knowledge in order to produce a dynamic organizational capability 
(Zahra, George, 2002), is a relevant factor for the capacity of firms to absorb different types of knowledge 
and to collaborate effectively with non-academic partners. 
Lastly, “industrial partners may have agendas that are not compatible with those of the entrepreneur, 
may have shorter term horizons that are not compatible with the development of the technology, may have 
considerably greater bargaining power over the distribution of gains at later stages in the process and may 
also place pressures on university to cede IP to them on disadvantageous terms” (Wright et al., 2004, p. 308; 
2007, p. 157). Considering that alliances are a reasonable choice for SMEs on the one hand, and a majority 
of such partnerships does not succeed on the other hand, Niedergassel and Leker (2011, p. 148) investigated 
R&D cooperation projects and concluded that “industry might consider new organizational forms of 
cooperative R&D projects to achieve higher levels of closeness with academic partners. For instance, in the 
chemical industry many firms recently established separate organizational units designed to enhance 
cooperative activities with external partners”. This new approach enables the different partners to work in 
close physical proximity for longer periods of time and gives an opportunity for a shared cultural space that 
lays the foundation for high-quality relationships fostering tacit knowledge sharing. In the case of SO, a 
solution suggested in the literature is the attraction of surrogate entrepreneurs or external managers in the 
founding team of the company in order to compensate for the lack of entrepreneurial culture (Franklin et al., 
2001; Lockett et al., 2003; Wright et al., 2004, 2007; Mustar et al., 2006). According to Shane (2004, p. 
248), SO perform better if their founding team gathers people with industry experience and business 
knowledge. But “this alone is not enough...a successful university spin-off also needs inventor involvement”. 
Furthermore, this solution is not without drawbacks: it can be difficult to attract the best surrogate 
entrepreneur because of remuneration required and/or lack of suitable candidates (Franklin et al., 2001; 
Wright et al., 2004). As an alternative, Wright et al. (2004, p. 301) suggested the establishment of a joint 
venture spin-off (JVSO), where the industrial partner provides or substitutes surrogate entrepreneurs. But 
they also highlighted that the strong academic backing and know-how “brings scientific credibility to the 
venture which the industrial partner cannot otherwise attain”. In short, according to Miles et al.(1999, p. 20-
21), small technology-based firms “are ideal candidates for alliance arrangements”, because they have 
innovative ideas and products as well as weak resources and experience, but it is also underlined that 
“alliances alone are no guarantee of successful performance”. Furthermore, “alliances are not a cure-all for 
such firms. If the firm does not strive to develop itself as a viable independent entity, forging strategic 
alliances, no matter how successful, may not turn out to benefit the firm fully” (Miles et al., 1999, p. 28). 
Nevertheless, strategic alliances are not a remedy to all companies’ problems (de Man, Duysters, 2005) and 
Wright et al. (2004) acknowledge that collaboration is not a panacea for firms with limited resources like SO 
ones. Miles et al. (1999) found no difference in performance between firms involved in alliances and those 
not involved. One of the main problems is given by the recognition of alliance as a potential business 
opportunity: founders of new technology-based firms have a strong “independence” attitude and may 
develop organizational egocentricity (Venkataraman et al., 1990). Our empirical results (cf. infra) are in line 
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with this finding and they are strengthened by the singularity of the focus on particular firms as SO. To date, 
there are no other deep studies specifically focused on the issue of TIPs with SO. Therefore, the results of 
our investigation highlight that the specific case of SO calls for new ways of considering the role of TIPs for 
the development of the company. Actually, retaining the crucial role of shared knowledge in economic 
development, several papers suggested, in particular, that firms should go ahead elaborating over one to one 
industrial partnerships in order to embed themselves in more global Business Ecosystems (BES) either they 
are physical or digital.We specifically assume that the concept of BES is a suitable and effective complement 
to the establishment of TIPs and the formation of a classical cluster in a given geographical area (Porter, 
2000; Steiner, 2004). It is a pivotal tool in order to make clarity in the complex and confused world of SO. 
BES could have important consequences for the design of industrial policies and public support. Thinking 
about SO as BES could be a first step in order to try to implement policies at country level and not only at 
the single university level and to shed some light on a complex and confused phenomenon like SO, where no 
official statistics and no agreed definition exist. 
In order to draw the lines of our discussion and understand the effective meaning of the results of our 
empirical analysis, Table 1 provides an enlightenment of the main features identifiable in a TIP as well as in 
new types of partnerships, meaning physical and/or digital BES. Actually, business ecosystem is an 
emerging concept analogized from biology (Hannon, 1997). According to Peltoniemi and Vuori (2004) a 
business ecosystem is a dynamic structure which consists of an interconnected population of organizations. 
These organizations can be small firms, large corporations, universities, research centres, public sector 
organizations or any other actor which may influence the system. A business ecosystem develops itself 
through self-organization, emergence and co-evolution; competition and cooperation are both present 
(Corallo et al., 2007). Moore (1996) argues that in each ecosystem there is a large dominant actor, the 
“keystone species”, but it is not a powerful leader, because control is decentralised. In the specific case of 
SO, universities, science parks and incubators should play an integration role in connecting all the companies 
in a given industrial sector to a platform that aims to become a business ecosystem. In fact, a business 
ecosystem is not based on the geographical propinquity that is a feature of clusters5. It rather relies on 
competition and cooperation, interconnectedness and shared fate in a changing environment. A central 
importance is also given by interdependency and integration: business’s performance is dependent on the 
firm influencing assets outside its direct control and BES allow firms to create value that no single firm 
could create alone. A business ecosystem is a dynamic structure taking place as evolutionary mutual changes 
of organizations that interact and thus have an effect on one another. The symbiosis of a business ecosystem 
shares the fate of the network as a whole, regardless of the member’s apparent strength, just as individual 
species in a biological ecosystem (Iansiti, Levien, 2004; Corallo et al., 2007).  
 
 
 
                                                 
5 For a comparison of key features of cluster, value network and business ecosystem, see Peltoniemi (2005). 
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Table 1: TIPS vs BES in the SO perspective 
 
Traditional Industrial Partnerships (TIPs) 
Non-traditional partnerships: (Digital) Business 
Ecosystems (BES) 
Main 
features 
One to one relationships, closeness of partners, 
geographically limited 
Collective relationships; (e)-network of alliances; 
sharing of common knowledge background among 
several actors, not geographically limited: Digital 
BES, Nachira, (2002), Nachira et el. (2007) 
Long range cooperative associations on 
common projects (of specific interest), 
Hagedoorn et al. (2000); Yasuda (2005) 
Ad hoc and varied associations on needs (of general 
interest) 
Inherent tension between cooperation and 
competition 
Independence, cooperation and mutualistic co-
evolution, Li (2009) 
Ex-ante identified partners 
Dynamic structure: partners emerge during the 
process 
Substitution logic: separate and well defined 
role of every actor 
Complementary logic: mutual interdependence and 
scientific expertise 
Clear value chain skills 
Disruptive skills, tacit and codified knowledge, Shane 
(2004); Clarysse et al. (2011) 
Traditional contracts; formal relationships 
Innovative contract relationships; self-organization, 
emergence and co-evolution, Corallo et al. (2007); 
close, informal relationships 
Transaction-cost theory, Yasuda (2005); de 
Faria et al. (2010); resource-based view, 
Barney (1991); Barney et al. (2001) 
Bundle of similar characteristics 
Risk of failure because of opportunistic 
behaviour, information asymmetry, increased 
complexity, loss of autonomy, Chen (2004); 
Wright et al. (2004); de Man, Duysters (2005); 
Lokshin et al. (2011) 
Competition and cooperation, interconnectedness and 
shared fate, interdependency and integration, Moore 
(1993) 
Communication problems because of cultural 
differences and SO independence attitude, 
Shane (2004); O’Shea et al. (2005); van 
Gelderen et al. (2005); D’Este, Perkmann 
(2011) 
Shared cultural space: same research origin, same 
language, better communication, complementary 
capabilities, Niedergassel and Leker (2011); 
Bjerregaard (2010) 
Learning 
process 
Reciprocal exchange (i.e. supply of 
information/expertise vs supply of capital); 
development of trust in an unfamiliar context; 
absorptive capacity, Zahra, George (2002) 
Collective, informal and interpersonal relations in a 
familiar context (i.e. reciprocal scientific and 
technical learning for common advancement), cross-
fertilization, platform building 
Public policy 
implications 
Industrial support to firms 
Virtual cluster structuring; exchange of advice; 
creation of a set of industrial relations between SO; 
symbiotic relationships, Moore (1993, 1996, 2006); 
Iansiti, Levien (2004) 
Autonomous identity of every partner 
Creation of a stimulating industrial environment, a 
group identity and collective responsibility 
Sector specific policies Country level policies instead of university level ones 
Governance mode: the strongest partner leads 
the partnership process 
Governance mode: leadership of intermediary 
institutions: universities, science parks and incubators 
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2. Methodology and results 
Given the strong desire for independence of SO on the one hand (O’Shea et al., 2005; van Gelderenet 
al., 2005; D’Este, Perkmann, 2011) and the lack of managerial and business competencies on the other hand 
(Shane, 2004; Wright et al., 2007, 2004; Mustar et al., 2008; Clarysse et al., 2011), our goal was first of all 
to verify in which extent SO were rooted or not in the set of TIPs. Consequently, first of all we aimed at 
investigating the existence and the potential importance of a TIP for this particular kind of firm. Secondly, on 
the base of the results of the empirical analysis, we discussed and emphasized the role of “non”-traditional 
partnerships in the form of BES. SO founders are scientists and not managers, therefore differences might be 
expected in the way they run their company and in their performance, according they call or not for 
complementary competencies and assets through TIP. In order to investigate similarities between a 
SOwithTIP and a SOwithoutTIP, we built a specific questionnaire on these issues and we created a related 
database of the content of the questionnaires received (i.e. a specific section of the questionnaire investigated 
the main reasons for partnership creation and how it was implemented, or why the company had not looked 
for a partnership till then). It provided the basis for statistical comparative description and regression model. 
In a preliminary and exploratory phase, some face-to-face interviews enabled us to settle the specific 
industrial context of SO and, consequently, to build the questionnaire. A general investigation, not centred 
only on the existence of an industrial partnership, was useful as a means of overcoming possible wariness of 
the respondent on the reasons of the enquiry and enabled us to check the accuracy and coherence in the 
answers to the various sections. In addition, the data have been enriched by the provision of formal 
information collected from balance sheets. 
As expected, the results of the empirical analysis revealed similarities in some aspects and differences 
in others, even if the differences are subtle while the similarities are very evident. This finding will lead our 
following discussion about the potential role of BES, with suggestions for improvement of SO industrial 
policies.  
2.1 The empirical analysis: methodological insights 
The main concrete problem of the empirical analysis has been to identify the actual number and  
structure of SO founded in Italy. In fact, no official, complete and updated list of SO at the regional or 
national level does exist (Iacobucci et al., 2011). A similar problem has been recently encountered by 
Chapman et al. (2011) in an analysis focused on university-related companies in London: UK data collection 
on these companies has been formalized in recent years, but without the provision of significant information. 
Thus, the first step was to build such a database, investigating ILO, TTO and university websites to identify 
and collect the list of SO they point out, then verifying the completeness and updating of this list. A specific 
problem was due to the fact that each university takes care only of their “own” SO: the ones they participated 
to. Considering that the usual definition of SO includes, in general, companies built out of R&D and is not 
only restricted to the ones participated by a university, we completed our first list with the Italian science 
park and incubator tenants list. Since science parks and incubators do not make any difference between SO 
and start-ups, we set up direct contacts (telephone and e-mail) with university staff as well as science park 
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and incubator personnel. It gave us the possibility to filter the first list excluding firms not linked to the 
academic world.  
Thus, we could identify 419 SO6 constituting the SO Italian arena. Among them, 25 SO had the 
positive approval of the university at the time of the survey, but they had not yet been established. In 
conclusion, we were able to contact 394 firms. Face-to-face interviews were carried out between September 
and October 2007 in some selected case-studies and a questionnaire was sent to each of the 394 Italian SO7. 
The response rate was 39.5%: 155 SO accepted to answer to the questionnaire. Lack of time and privacy 
were the most predominant reasons for not participating in the questionnaire investigation: these motivations 
seem sound considering the inflationary rate of questionnaires received by SO in recent years (Gupte, 2007). 
Nevertheless, according to the sample size, to the geographical distribution of the universe and of the 
sample8and to the response rate in general achieved9, we can reasonably consider this sample as 
representative.  
The limits of a standard questionnaire were supplemented through further information obtained with 
Internet searching. Additionally, some interviews were undertaken before drawing up the questionnaire as a 
crucial tool in order to understand the general context and check the main aspects of deep examination. 
As we already explained, the final questionnaire was divided in several sections. The following 
analysis presents, on the one hand, the statistical description of the role played by TIPs according to the 
questionnaire answers. It portrays the main characteristics of SO and it provides inspiring comparisons 
regarding some main dimensions of these firms (e.g. history of creation, motivations, capital structure, 
location). On the other hand, we built a regression model in order to weight the influence of the presence or 
the absence of a TIP on added value of a SO. An objective assessment based on data gathered through Aida 
data bank10 has been used in order to confirm and deepen the questionnaire results. The aim of the 
comparison was to highlight whether there have been any differences in added value between SOwithTIP 
and SOwithoutTIP in the year 2007 through the use of data taken from balance sheets. We decided to limit 
the analysis on the year 2007 to be in tune with our investigation period on the universe of Italian SO 
(January-June 2008). Given the difficulty of obtaining data on Italian SO, we were able to identify 98 SO 
(63.5%) starting from the original sample of 155 who originally answered our questionnaire. Among the 57 
missing firms: 9 companies established in 2008 and 22 created in 2007 had not yet deposited the balance 
sheet at this time; the remaining were not available on Aida since the specific and limited form of 
                                                 
6 This list is updated at June 2008 (year of the empirical investigation through a questionnaire). 
7
The questionnaire was sent by e-mail to SO between January and June 2008 with information about the purpose and 
details of the survey. An e-mail reminder was sent to firms that did not reply to the first e-mail within a month. 
8
The distribution by Regions of the 155 questionnaires revealed that 58% was from the North, 23% from the Centre and 
19% from the South and Islands, while the Italian distribution of the 419 SO showed 54% from the North, 25% from the 
Centre and 21% from the South and Islands.  
9 Sheehan (2001) finds response rates to oscillate between 21.6% and 36% and Jobber and Saunders (1993) indicate that 
the rate of response in business-oriented studies is more sensitive than consumers’ ones to characteristics as the number 
of questions, the length of the survey, etc. [cited in Squicciarini, 2008, p. 50]. 
10 AIDA is a databank that provides company accounts, ratios, activities for 950,000 Italian companies.  
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partnerships (not capital supported) was not taken into account in the databank (for 5 SO), or because of their 
low level of capital (for 21 SO).   
2.2 Results: the - unexpected - limited role of TIPs for SO 
The overall sample was divided in two groups in order to compare SOwithTIP and SOwithoutTIP 
companies. We shall firstly present the main findings of descriptive statistics and then our regression model.  
The first - and somehow main - results confirm that SO are not used to collaborate with TIPs and that 
in any case TIPs did not matter much for SO’ performance. Our analysis revealed that 56 SO (36%) out of 
155 have an alliance, while 99 (64%) are without alliance companies. Surprisingly, findings showed few 
conclusive differences between the two groups. Furthermore, at best the evidence suggests that the 
characteristic of being a SOwithTIP or not had no influence on the level of added value in the year 2007. 
There was no different performance between SOwithTIP and SOwithoutTIP in 2007 in terms of added value, 
as showed by the regression model that is highly significant (see Model 1 table in Appendix). These findings 
suggest that SO performance is not strictly in relation with TIPs: this calls, then, to a broader perspective, 
putting at stake pivotal factors such as age, resources, motivations, location issues, industrial context, 
university and science park-incubator involvement, and presence of patents.   
Consequently, considering the characteristics of SO, the results are more specifically presented in the 
following order. Since the literature suggests the importance of organisational learning and the specificities 
of SO, we firstly considered the age impact looking at the history of creation: a slight difference in age has 
been observed, thus confirming the reliability of the comparison between SOwithTIP and SOwithoutTIP. 
Then, we verified the influence of the institutional form of the society on the propensity to develop TIPs 
(unexpectedly most SOwithTIP as well as SOwithoutTIP are limited liability companies11) and the 
motivations that led SOwithTIP to look for a traditional industrial partner. Surprisingly, the “lack of 
managerial and financial competencies” is not one of the first choices: this finding suggests that, 
notwithstanding the attention provided by the literature, a TIP is not considered by SO themselves as the best 
solution to the knowledge gap. It is also worth noting the autonomy propensity given by the choice of self-
training as main solution chosen for filling the knowledge gap as well as the significance of the perception of 
no lack of managerial competence. Subsequently, given the importance of the contribution to capital, 
accordingly we analysed the differences in capital structure between SOwithTIP and SOwithoutTIP: as 
expected, differences in capital structure exist, but they are not very marked. Afterwards, given the fact that 
“the spatial location of firms is particularly important when considering a country characterised by a 
considerable regional divide as Italy” (Iammarino et al., 2009, p. 99)we examined the role of location. While 
industrial intensity may be different according to the Italian regions, our results demonstrated the absence of 
significant differences among the North, the Centre and the South of Italy; we verified a possible difference 
in the interest of the university and the science park-incubator as well as the presence of a patent. Again, 
similarity instead of difference emerged. This was confirmed by the absence of specificities in the sector and 
                                                 
11Namely s.r.l., in Italian legal terms. 
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product or service orientation. Finally, we investigated differences in the performance: in line with the 
questionnaire results, an absence of marked impact emerged.    
Given these assumptions, the following description of the results of our investigation clearly demonstrates 
that TIPs play a limited role for SO growth and development: they provide capital and competencies, but 
their contributions are not translated into a superior performance and/or differences in company legal form, 
location, university and science park-incubator interest, presence of patents, industrial sector and product-
service activity. This finding drives our subsequent discussion about the complementary role that could be 
played by the structuring of BES.  
2.2.1 Similar age effects 
According to the literature (Shane, 2004; Lockett et al., 2005; Wright et al., 2007), the history of 
creation shows off a significant growth of Italian SO in recent years. More specifically, table 2 highlights an 
increased development of SOwithTIP since 2005, while SOwithoutTIP were increasing yet since 2003. 
Table 2: Year of creation 
Year SOwithTIP % SOwithoutTIP % 
1995 0 0 1 1.01 
1996 1 1.79 0 0 
1997 0 0 3 3.03 
1999 1 1.79 1 1.01 
2000 4 7.14 3 3.03 
2001 1 1.79 1 1.01 
2002 3 5.36 3 3.03 
2003 2 3.57 10 10.10 
2004 5 8.93 12 12.12 
2005 10 17.86 13 13.13 
2006 14 25.00 17 17.17 
2007 13 23.21 26 26.26 
2008 1 1.79 8 8.08 
No answer 1 1.79 1 1.01 
Total  56 100.00 99 100.00 
 
Accordingly, in the regression model the average age of a SOwithTIP was 2.5 years while the average 
age of a SOwithoutTIP was 2.9 years. Results showed a weak significant coefficient (P<0.10) relating to the 
number of years on the market: every year older on the market, SO had also a higher level of added value of 
Euros 27,681 in average (see Appendix). 
The slight difference in age can be explained by the success of the concept and some fashion effects 
while the number of available industrial partners did not grow in the same perspective. Asymmetric 
information (Akerlof, 1970), self-governance tendency on the part of SO and a general independence attitude 
(Shane, 2004; O’Shea et al., 2005; van Gelderen et al., 2005; D’Este, Perkmann, 2011) are key obstacles. 
Yet, the absence of marked differences in the history of creation provides interesting data to compare the 
situation and the success of SOwithTIP and SOwithoutTIP. 
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2.2.2 Similar legal patternbut different motivations 
First of all, we verified the formal legal structure of the companies. Surprisingly, no significant 
differences emerged. In line with the results of the survey undertaken by Iacobucci et al. (2011), the 
prevalent form of society for both the groups of SO is limited liability company - s.r.l. - (more than 90%); 
two or three firms are joint-stock companies - S.p.A. - and two or three are limited partnerships. 
Furthermore, the variable “company” was not a statistically significant variable in the regression model (see 
Appendix). 
First reasons for creation of the firm are the same: use research results (35% as first choice) and move 
from idea to market (more than 20%). Motivations for the presence or absence of a TIP are, of course, 
different: SOwithoutTIP have affirmed that the main reason of partnership absence is linked to their young 
age. The reasons for the choice of an industrial partner for SOwithTIP are linked to the possibility of 
increasing the number of customers and of commerce as well as to similar interests and activities, while the 
lack of managerial and financial competencies has a minor importance (table 3).  
Table 3: Reasons for the choice of an industrial partner 
Possible answers First choice Second choice 
 SO % SO % 
More visibility and external prestige 6 10.71% 6 10.71% 
More credibility towards clients 1 1.79% 5 8.93% 
More clients and commerce 19 33.93% 5 8.93% 
Move from national market to international market 0 0.00% 4 7.14% 
Possibility of stock exchange quotations 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
More security and defence against competitors 1 1.79% 1 1.79% 
Need of financial resources 5 8.93% 5 8.93% 
Lack of managerial and financial competencies 6 10.71% 4 7.14% 
Common interests and activities  10 17.86% 17 30.36% 
Other 5 8.93% 5 8.93% 
No answer 3 5.36% 4 7.14% 
Total 56 100.00% 56 100.00% 
 
It is therefore interesting to highlight the answers provided by SOwithTIP and SOwithoutTIP to the 
question about the solutions to lack of managerial competence (table 4). 
Table 4: Solutions to lack of managerial competence 
Possible answers SOwithTIP SOwithoutTIP 
 SO % SO % 
External manager 7 12.50% 14 14.14% 
Aid from incubator 6 10.71% 23 23.23% 
Self-training 19 33.93% 35 35.35% 
Aid from industrial partner 10 17.86% 0 0.00% 
No lacks 11 19.64% 22 22.22% 
No answer 3 5.36% 5 5.05% 
Total 56 100.00% 99 100.00% 
 
Surprisingly, “self-training” is the first answer for SOwithTIP as well as for SOwithoutTIP, followed 
by “no lacks” and then by “aid from industrial partner” for SOwithTIP and “aid from incubator” and “no 
lacks” for SOwithoutTIP. Furthermore, “external manager” is not one of the first choices for both the 
samples of firms. This result confirms that aid from a traditional industrial partner and from an external 
 16 
manager is not considered by SO themselves as key solutions. Aid from incubator has more importance for 
SOwithoutTIP even if the percentage of hospitality in a science park-incubator is quite similar for 
SOwithTIP and SOwithoutTIP (see section 2.2.5). We can, therefore, assume that aid from incubator for 
SOwithoutTIP substitutes aid from industrial partner for SOwithTIP.  
Looking more specifically at the partnership, it has been established with a contribution to capital 
(48.21%) and to competencies (17.86%); the presence of a patent has had no importance (table 5). The high 
percentage of contribution to capital is linked to the financing gap of newly established companies. 
Therefore, we can assume that a difference exists in the capital structure of SOwithTIP and SOwithoutTIP.  
 
Table 5: Realisation of the partnership 
How the partnership has been established? 
 SO % 
Subdivision of competencies 7 12.50% 
Apport of capital 27 48.21% 
Apport of competencies 10 17.86% 
Apport of other subventions 3 5.36% 
Apport of a patent 0 0.00% 
Other 3 5.36% 
No answer 6 10.71% 
Total 56 100.00% 
2.2.3 Differences in capital structure? 
As established from the results of table 6, differences exist, according the case, regarding the capital 
structure. The capital distribution has highlighted that the majority of SOwithTIP and SOwithoutTIP has a 
low capital, but 17.86% of SOwithTIP has a high capital compared to 8.08% of SOwithoutTIP (table 6). In 
particular, the number of SO with a high capital has doubled between the establishment of the firm and the 
year of investigation, while the number of firms with a low capital has diminished.  
Table 6: Initial and present capital 
 SOwithTIP SOwithoutTIP 
Capital (euro) Initial Year 2008 
 
Initial 
 
Year 2008 
 SO % SO % SO % SO % 
Very low (<10,000) 0 0% 0 0% 5 5.05% 2 2.02% 
Low (from 10,000 to 
20,000) 39 69.64% 33 58.93% 68 68.69% 62 62.63% 
Medium  (from 20,001 to 
50,000) 8 14.29% 8 14.29% 11 11.11% 16 16.16% 
Medium-high (from 
50,001 to 90,000) 3 5.36% 3 5.36% 9 9.09% 8 8.08% 
High (> 90,000) 5 8.93% 10 17.86% 4 4.04% 8 8.08% 
No answer 1 1.79% 2 3.57% 2 2.02% 3 3.03% 
Total 56 100.00% 56 100.00% 99 100.00% 99 100.00% 
 
Furthermore, 25% of SOwithTIP has registered an increase in capital compared to 14.14% of 
SOwithoutTIP.  
If we compare the financial resources utilised by SO, our results show that personal capital has been 
utilised in percentage slightly higher by SOwithoutTIP, while regional, national and European funds have 
been utilised in percentage higher by SOwithTIP. A subtle difference is observable in the venture capital 
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support (table 7), even if a venture capitalist is more willing to invest in SO where the team has business 
experience (Wright et al., 2007). And the limited number of SO supported by venture capitalists prevents us 
from investigating further the effective role of venture capital for these particular firms, even if BES could 
improve the interest and the participation of venture capitalists thanks to the inherent strength arising from 
such new types of partnerships.  
Table 7: Financial resources 
Possible choices Yes (SOwithTIP) % Yes(SOwithoutTIP) % 
1-Personal and family capital 45 80.36% 86 86.87% 
2-Bank loans 6 10.71% 8 8.08% 
3-Regional, national, European grants; Start-
Cup12; National Innovation Prize; MIP13 33 58.93% 41 41.41% 
4-Venture Capital/Business Angels 4 7.14% 4 4.04% 
5-Credit support 1 1.79% 1 1.01% 
6-Other forms of support 2 3.57% 8 8.08% 
2.2.4 Location and industrial geographical context 
One may think that SO should more specifically be located near clusters and industrial areas. On the 
contrary, no specificity regarding the location and the industrial geographical context actually emerged. 
From this viewpoint, the case of Italy is particularly interesting because there is a wide tradition of industrial 
districts (Garofoli, 1992, 2002; Becattini et al., 2003; Camuffo, Grandinetti, 2011) and a strong geographical 
industrial characterization of regions, known as the Italian innovative and regional divide (Iammarino et al. 
2009). Recently, Hussler et al. (2010, p. 512 and p. 514) investigated the development model of the Province 
of Milan in Lombardy Region (North of Italy): it is based on a network of small and micro companies 
integrated with a limited number of medium-large firms, “which make up the famous Italian industrial 
district” and “the Milan area is the most highly qualified scientific district in Italy”. The delay in economic 
development in Southern regions compared to the Centre and the North of the country still persists (Bank of 
Italy, 2008; 2010). 
Yet no significant difference emerged in the geographical distribution of SOwithTIP and 
SOwithoutTIP: the North of Italy is prevalent for both the samples (59% for SOwithTIP and 58% for 
SOwithoutTIP) with subtle differences for the Centre (30% for SOwithTIP and 18% for SOwithoutTIP) and 
the South (11% for SOwithTIP and 24% for SOwithoutTIP). The questionnaire answers highlighted also a 
similar attitude at local/regional level for the market: 10.71% of SOwithTIP and 9.09% of SOwithoutTIP 
work on the local and regional market.  
Furthermore, the regression model estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis 
did not highlight a significant coefficient for the variable “location” (see Appendix). We could then expect 
                                                 
12Start-Cup competition has the goal to foster and support the creation of high knowledge companies, to promote 
regional economic development and to stimulate the entrepreneurial orientation of researchers. The outcome is in form 
of awards, cash, training and advice services.  
13MIP-Mettersi in Proprio (Start up your own business) is a support service to enterprise creation. It is made up of 
several integrated actions, with the aim of spreading a culture of entrepreneurship and of fostering the start-up and 
development of successful companies.  
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that, if a difference does not exist in the location, it may be found in the parent institute interest (Link, 
Welsh, 2011). 
2.2.5 No difference in university and science park-incubator interest 
Surprisingly, the interest showed or not by the university towards the SO initiative, the hospitality or 
not in a science park or an incubator and the presence or not of a patent, did not show a significant difference 
between the two groups of firms. In fact, tables 8, 9and 10highlight a similar percentage for SOwithTIP and 
SOwithoutTIP.  
Table 8: University interest 
Possible choice SOwithTIP % SOwithoutTIP % 
University interest 38 67.86% 62 62.63% 
Absence of university interest 15 26.79% 27 27.27% 
No answer 3 5.36% 10 10.10% 
Total 56 100.00% 99 100.00% 
 
Table 9: Hospitality in an incubator or science park 
Possible choice SOwithTIP % SOwithoutTIP % 
Hospitality in an incubator/science park 23 41.07% 42 42.42% 
Absence of hospitality 33 58.93% 57 57.58% 
Total 56 100.00% 99 100.00% 
 
Table 10: Presence of a patent 
Possible choice SOwithTIP % SOwithoutTIP % 
Presence of a patent 14 25.00% 26 26.26% 
Absence of a patent 42 75.00% 72 72.73% 
No answer 0 0.00% 1 1.01% 
Total 56 100.00% 99 100.00% 
2.2.6 Similarity in industrial sectors and product or service activity 
Considering their offering, no specificity emerged among Italian SO, neither according to the 
industrial sector nor according to the structure of product or service activity. The industrial sector 
distribution highlights a prevalence of the ICT sector (32% and 26% for SOwithTIP and SOwithoutTIP 
respectively); the engineering (25% and 22%) and the biopharmaceutical (16% and 26%) sectors follow. 
Again, the dummy variables for the industrial sectors were not statistically significant variables (see 
Appendix). Furthermore, we expected an influence of the industrial partner on the nature of the activity. 
Nonetheless, expected differences did not emerge. SOwithTIP affirmed to be product SO in percentage 
slightly higher than SOwithoutTIP (table 11). 
Table 11: Product and service SO 
 SOwithTIP SOwithoutTIP 
 SO % SO % 
Product 20 35.71% 31 31.31% 
Service 36 64.29% 68 68.69% 
Total 56 100.00% 99 100.00% 
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2.2.7 The regression model14: two specific findings regarding performance 
A regression model has been elaborated in order to corroborate and to strengthen the findings of the 
descriptive statistics. Our main argument was to focus on the influence of the presence or the absence of a 
TIP on added value of a SO. We considered only added value because of the difficulty in measuring the 
performance of new ventures and in obtaining reliable data on a particular kind of firm like the SO one.  
The model has been specifically built on the following basis: in order to choose the balance sheets’ 
variables to be included in the model we started from the main results of the questionnaire investigation15. 
The questionnaire data suggested us how to build the comparison between the two groups of SO. We used 
‘‘added value’’ as dependent variable while the independent variables employed in the analysis were as 
follows: ‘‘flagspinoff’’ for SOwithTIP and SOwithoutTIP16; ‘‘total assets17’’ as a variable for firm size18; 
‘‘time’’ measured as the number of years on the market19; “company” as a variable for the form of society 
(srl or SpA)20; “location” (North, Centre, South and Islands)21; “sector of activity” (five groups of Ateco22 
code of two digit)23.In order to facilitate the reading, the detailed and complete results are provided in 
Appendix and we exhibit here the main outputs. 
The results of our model underline two main findings. Besides the weak significant coefficient 
(P<0.10) relating to the variable “time”, we found a strongly significant coefficient (P<0.01) relating to the 
“total assets” variable: SO with a higher level of total assets had also a higher level of added value, but the 
impact is very low. 
The model demonstrates that the average level of added value in 2007 for SOwithTIP was Euros 
169,355, while for SOwithoutTIP was Euros 95,341. Nevertheless, the regression model did not highlight a 
positive or negative impact of SOwithTIP or SOwithoutTIP on the level of added value in 2007. Flagspinoff 
was not a statistically significant variable in this model. In other words, the characteristic of being a 
                                                 
14Descriptive statistics, correlation matrix, the linear regression model and tests for multi-collinearity are described in 
Tables 12-16 (see Appendix).  
15 Additionally, it also provided a confirmation of the pertinence of our sample: all firms were actual SO. 
16We measured the variable “flagspinoff” by using a binary variable which took the value 1 if the firm had an alliance 
and 0 otherwise. 
17 This variable has been calculated as total assets minus fixed assets. 
18 We decided to measure the firm size in terms of “total assets”, because it has been not possible to have enough and 
reliable data on the number of employees. 
19 We measured the variable “time” starting from 0 if the firm was created in 2007; 1 if it was established in 2006; 2 if it 
was founded in 2005, and so on. 
20 We measured the variable “company” with a binary variable which took the value 1 if the firm was a srl and 0 
otherwise. 
21 We measured the variable “location” by introducing 3 dummy variables for North, Centre and South and Islands of 
Italy. 
22Since the 1st of January 2008 a new classification of economic activities called Ateco 2007 is in force as the single 
rule of classification for public administration. This new classification in Italy is published by Istat (National Institute of 
Statistics) and it is the national version of the European nomenclature NACE Rev. 2, established by the Regulation EC 
n. 1893/2006 of the European Parliament and the European Council.  
23 We controlled for industry effects by employing 5 dummy variables for the industrial sectors of ICT, transport, 
biopharmaceutical, engineering, other. These variables take a value of 1 if the company is in the sector and 0 otherwise. 
These sectors were identified starting from the Ateco 2007 classification: we formed groups of firms with the same 
Ateco code of two digit. In the sector named “other” were included the few firms dealing in general in the consultancy 
industry and in the commerce and editor industries. 
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SOwithTIP or not had no impact on the level of added value in 2007. This result is consistent with the 
questionnaire results: differences between SOwithTIP and SOwithoutTIP exist, but these differences seem to 
be not so marked to have an impact on the performance. SOwithTIP have more capital availability, thanks to 
the industrial partner support, but this characteristic is not translated in a superior performance: SOwithTIP 
and SOwithoutTIP have the same form of society, SOwithTIP are not strategically located in the more 
industrialised and fertile part of Italy, are not specifically supported by their parent institute or hosted in an 
incubator-science park, do not have an higher number of patents and do not show significant differences in 
the sector distribution and product or service orientation compared to SOwithoutTIP.    
What can we assume, then? Implications of the results, the potential role of BES and suggestions for 
policy improvement are analysed in the following section. 
3. Discussion 
Literature pinpoints that it is difficult to persuade SO founders to be involved in a traditional 
partnership agreement, because of their specific characteristics and marked desire for independence (Shane, 
2004). Furthermore, it underlines that integration and motivation of the SO staff and the partner team has to 
be achieved. Trust, interdependency between partners, frequency of communication and closeness of 
partners are significant elements (Sherwood, Covin, 2008; Bruneel et al. 2010; Bjerregaard, 2010; 
Niedergassel, Leker, 2011). Nevertheless, as underlined in general for many companies by Revilla et al. 
(2005) and Chen (2004), SO in particular cannot focus only on their sole internal capabilities, because they 
suffer gaps of managerial and business knowledge as well as a lack of financial resources and a small size 
(Mustar et al., 2008; van Geenhuizen, Soetanto, 2009; Batheltet al., 2010). However, our empirical analysis 
highlighted a self-training propensity and a perception of no lack of business competence. As a consequence, 
the actual articulation of SO seems more inclined towards “non”-traditional partnerships like the 
embeddedness in BES. 
3.1 The structuring of a business ecosystem: characteristics, governance and location 
The structuring of a business ecosystem may highlight in which extent traditional one to one industrial 
partnerships may be conceived not in the traditional sense, but rather in the form of a set of industrial 
relations between SO. Analyzing university SO in Northern Ireland, Harrison and Leitch (2010, p. 1244) 
underlined that the economic impact of SO “is enhanced when they are embedded in a strong local 
entrepreneurial ecosystem or knowledge pool”. Nonetheless, from the Irish companies analyzed by Harrison 
and Leitch (2010) the regional ecosystem was far from munificent in terms of access to business 
development resources.  
Niedergassel and Leker (2011) and Bjerregaard (2010, p. 106) investigated R&D collaboration 
between SMEs and academia: the last one observed that “a shared cultural micro-cosmos for collaboration, 
which in most cases was based on tacit rather than written agreements” contributed to the lack of normative 
conflict between interests, goals and cultures. This “shared cultural space” can be applied in the case of SO, 
which share the same research origin as well as tacit knowledge, and can benefit from e-networks. In fact, 
Roberts (2000, p. 435) argued that the ability of ICTs to assist the transfer of tacit knowledge is restricted by 
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the need for trust and mutual understanding facilitated by face-to-face relationships. But, if the parties 
involved “share a common social and cultural context”, “they may share tacit knowledge by assimilating 
codified knowledge and thereby creating new tacit knowledge”. To this aim, the SO phenomenon with its 
“knowledge” background is a useful and interesting case-study in order to investigate the Steiner (2004) 
question of how the need for spatial proximity can be made compatible with the need for connectivity and to 
tackle the problem to find ways to enlarge the geographical span of knowledge spillovers. Our empirical 
analysis highlighted that SOwithTIP chose a traditional industrial partner because of same interests and 
activities and looking for more clients and commerce. Nevertheless, the contribution to capital and the 
competencies provided by the partner were not so significant: the industrial partner and/or an external 
manager seemed not to be very important as a solution to lack of managerial competence and the regression 
model did not highlight an impact of SOwithTIP or SOwithoutTIP on the level of added value in 2007. 
Furthermore, the industrial partner did not influence the form of society as well as the sector and product or 
service orientation: no marked differences emerged in the comparison between SOwithTIP and 
SOwithoutTIP. As we already mentioned in the introductory part, these findings may suggest the importance 
of “non”-traditional industrial partnerships. While the literature underlines the role of industrial partnerships, 
one could hardly argue the singularity of SO. Therefore, we rather suggest SO demonstrate that industrial 
partnerships have to be conceived not in the traditional sense, but rather as a set of industrial relations 
between SO which constitute a virtual industrial cluster – what the literature calls “BES”.  
As this was already the case for a SO, “the business ecosystem concept has been used by several 
authors, but it still lacks a precise definition” (Peltoniemi, Vuori, 2004, p. 2; Peltoniemi, 2006, p. 10). The 
concept was introduced in the early 1990s by Moore (1993, p. 76) who suggested “a company be viewed not 
as a member of a single industry but as part of a business ecosystem that crosses a variety of industries. In a 
business ecosystem, companies coevolve capabilities around a new innovation: they work cooperatively and 
competitively to support new products, satisfy customer needs, and eventually incorporate the next round of 
innovations”. Comparing a business’s evolution path to an ecosystem can be difficult and only a few studies 
in the literature have attempted such a complex investigation (Peltoniemi, Vuori, 2004; Corallo et al., 2007; 
Li, 2009). Taking into consideration the evolutionary and collective dimension of industrial partnerships, 
several consequences arise. The main important one is probably the governance and leadership concern: 
“who” takes the role of the leader and orient the industrial dynamics in a community of firms. Such 
leadership is important because it enables all ecosystem members to invest towards a shared future of profits 
(Moore, 1993). A central role is played by universities, because they are an important engine of knowledge 
spillovers (Clarysse et al., 2011; Audretsch et al., 2012; Huggins et al., 2012; Lawton Smith, Bagchi-Sen, 
2012). This is confirmed by the recent investigation in search of key obstacles to growth undertaken by van 
Geenhuizen and Soetanto (2009, p. 679): they recommended that “programs aimed at nurturing highly 
innovative spin-offs in manufacturing should include early and more substantial support, particularly access 
to networking with or through the university, and supporting activity of the university such as acting as 
launching customer and intermediary agent in export relations”. A leader has to be able to direct internal 
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and external changes and to manage the transformation of the business ecosystem from a random collection 
of elements to a more structured community. This role can be taken by intermediary institutions like not only 
universities but also incubators and science and technology parks. Our empirical analysis revealed that aid 
from the incubator/science park has been of greater importance as a solution to lack of managerial 
competence (11% for SOwithTIP and 23% for SOwithoutTIP) compared to aid from an external manager 
(12% for SOwithTIP and 14% for SOwithoutTIP). And these results could be higher if science parks and 
incubators improved their effectiveness24.In our opinion, these structures should apply a concerted effort in 
order to build bargaining power and to make it uneconomical for competitors to enter. Given the fact that in 
a business ecosystem a firm not only has to build its standards, but also to work hard to help others to 
achieve their own benefits, a science park or an incubator can work in order to achieve this goal on behalf of 
the firms alone. The members in the ecosystem are independent, yet they co-evolve with the science park-
incubator’s roadmap. Business strategies at the single level become systematic cooperation and single 
growth becomes co-evolution (Li, 2009). According to Peltoniemi (2006, p. 18), in a business ecosystem 
“conscious choice, limited knowledge, interconnectedness and feedback loops result in a nondeterministic, 
nonlinear and unpredictable future constructed by organizations”. In the case of SO, mutualistic coevolution 
may be applied: firms develop cooperation and complementary capabilities in order to compete with a third 
party. The recent analysis undertaken by de Faria et al. (2010, p. 1090) corroborated that “close partners 
such as firms within the same group or suppliers are more effective for the development of innovation 
cooperation activities. Technology also plays a role, as firms from industries with higher levels of technology 
attach a higher value to cooperation partners”. 
In order to identify factors that might highlight the structuring of BES, we start from some 
considerations on the location. 
The literature has stressed and proved the importance of geographical proximity between SO and their 
parent institute and science park-incubator25. Geographical proximity is a key factor for networks formation, 
mutual trust and cooperation (Piscitello, Sgobbi, 2004; Audretsch et al., 2012). High-tech clusters arise 
where knowledge is “produced”, because proximity is an advantage for knowledge transmission: the variable 
“space” is pivotal (Krugman, 1998). The importance of trust encouraged by repeated face-to-face 
interactions has led Saxenian (1994, p. 161, cited in Wessner, 2009, p. 23) to observe that “paradoxically 
regions offer an important source of competitive advantage even as production and markets become 
increasingly global”. Nevertheless, Kroll and Liefner (2008) in their analysis on the Chinese case, have 
argued that most authors agree that up to now cooperation between universities and companies remains 
weak. Our empirical analysis results are in line with these considerations: no specificity emerged between 
SOwithTIP and SOwithoutTIP about the interest of the university and the hospitality in a science park-
incubator. With these considerations in mind, we suggest to go forward and link the “locally confined area” 
                                                 
24See, among others, Siegel et al. (2003) for the UK; Rothaermel, Thursby (2005) for the US; Colombo, Delmastro 
(2002), Co-author (2011) for Italy; Schwartz (2009) for Germany; Sofouli, Vonortas (2007) for Greece. 
25For a comprehensive discussion on the distance between the science park and the university campus and the 
importance of proximity, see Link, Scott, (2006; 2007); Wessner, ed., (2009). 
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(Kroll, Liefner, 2008, p. 302) – given by SO, the parent institute and a science park-incubator – to the 
advantages of the Internet and the new technologies (Co-author et al., 2009; Co-author, 2010) and therefore 
to the possibility to build not only “face-to-face networks” but also “e-networks”. ICT technologies and 
globalisation reduces the importance of geography (Moore, 1996; Boschma, 2005). Steiner (2002; 2004) 
argued that the actual and future improvements in the ICT field will enable the development of clusters not 
limited to specific geographical locations. Furthermore, Porter (1998, p. 81) argued that “all formal alliances 
involve their own complex bargaining and governance problems and can inhibit a company’s flexibility. The 
close, informal relationships possible among companies in a cluster are often a superior arrangement”. We 
build on these assumptions for the SO context. This means to build a network of BES that are something 
more than a traditional cluster and they are not geographically limited in given areas or in the North, the 
Centre and the South of a country. A “bundle of similar characteristics” identifies a business ecosystem. In 
the case of SO these characteristics are identifiable first of all in the specificity of the “knowledge” 
background, in the industrial sector, the product or service orientation, the low or high capital, the national or 
international attitude. Communication and networking are facilitated by a similar origin: SO come from the 
same social context that is the research world. These firms are linked to the parent institute proximity and 
facilities; therefore they could find obstacles in locating in a classical cluster or industrial district in a given 
geographical area. And in fact our empirical analysis showed the absence of any specificity about the 
location of SOwithTIP and SOwithoutTIP. If we go beyond the geographical factor and “space”, that should 
not be a boundary but an advantage thanks to the Internet and ICT potentialities, and if we go beyond the 
“single” university/science park strategy, we are able to make the overall extent of the phenomenon clear and 
map all the SO established in a given country. 
3.2 ICT-supported virtual networks and Digital Business Ecosystems 
The weakness of location influence on industrial relationship supports, therefore, the argument that 
geographical proximity may be substituted by ICT-supported virtual networks and communities of practice. 
In recent years, we have assisted to a renewed interest of practitioners and industrial policy makers for 
the concept of business ecosystem. More specifically, since 2002 the concept of business ecosystem has 
attracted deep attention in the digital evolution because of the attempt to build a network of “digital BES” 
fostering the local development (Nachira, 2002; Nachira et al., 2007). The Digital Business Ecosystem 
represents business-to-business interactivity supported by a software platform, which should have the 
desirable properties of a natural ecosystem and display marked network effects. Armed with this 
infrastructure the ecosystem could achieve evolution, self-organization, and a self-optimizing environment 
(Stanley, Briscoe, 2010).The European Council held in Lisbon on March 2000 recognised the need for 
Europe for an exploitation of new opportunities of the economy and in particular the Internet. The building 
of a community that shares business, knowledge and infrastructures will affect the ways business is 
conducted in the future and will lead to alliances, partnerships and collaboration. Small organisations, facing 
difficulties to the migration to e-business, could take advantage of this evolution, but a networked 
organization, cooperating and sharing information and instruments could help to achieve this goal. The 
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network organization linked to the flexibility that characterizes SMEs could reach positive results preserving 
the small dimension of this kind of firms. This is true for SO as well as for SMEs enhanced by ICT 
application and services to improve their efficiency and to compete with larger software houses (Peltoniemi, 
Vuori, 2004). 
Therefore, the term Digital Business Ecosystem derives by adding “digital” (Nachira, 2002) in front of 
Business Ecosystem (Moore, 1996) and it refers to a socio-economic development catalysed by the use of the 
Internet and the ICT. Nachira emphasised the coevolution aspect of BES with their digital representations 
(Stanley, Briscoe, 2010), hence Digital BES (Nachira et al.,2007). “A Digital Ecosystem is essentially the 
distribution of desired server functionality amongst a population of nodes. Digital Business Ecosystems are a 
platform for a network based economy of business ecosystems, providing the necessary technical 
infrastructure and legal mechanisms for the creation of networked economies” (Stanley, Briscoe, 2010, p. 8 
and 21). 
Nachira et al. (2007, p. 7) argued that digital ecosystems are seen as even more effective at the 
regional rather than at the national or international scale, because common language leads to a shared 
understanding of reality, which leads to shared means of expression and therefore similar and interdependent 
technologies. “The Digital Ecosystems initiative aims at helping local economic actors become active 
players in globalisation, “valorising” their local culture and vocations and enabling them to interact and 
create value networks at the global level. Increasingly this approach, dubbed “glocalization”, is being 
considered a successful strategy of globalisation that preserves regional growth and identity (Khondker, 
2004)”. According to Porter (1998; 2000, p. 32), “globalization and the ease of transportation and 
communication...have created the location paradox...Paradoxically, the most enduring competitive 
advantages in a global economy seem to be local”: knowledge and relationships are among these local 
advantages. If we think about the universe of SO of a given “country” as the “local level”, then we are able 
to preserve the knowledge component, the independence attitude and the potentialities of this particular kind 
of firms in a globalised world. 
The challenge lies in developing a system in which SO can foster their knowledge potentialities and 
maintain some sovereignty and autonomy as well as internal control, while also engaging in a superior 
structure that organizes and takes into account the needs and the differences in operating procedures and 
practices of the single parties. In our opinion, this challenge is a set and network of industrial relations 
interpreted as what the literature calls “BES” either they are physical or digital. 
4. Limitations and concluding remarks 
According to Wright et al. (2004) the commercialisation of scientific discoveries through a joint 
venture spin-off (JVSO) has been neglected in the literature. From that extent, our research constitutes a 
useful and rare investigation of SO on a large and systematic basis. Of course, we need to emphasize that this 
study suffers from some shortcomings, but many of these limitations are common to most recent empirical 
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investigations in this field26. First of all, despite the well-recognized value of studying the SO phenomenon, 
empirical studies on this topic are continuously constrained by the limited availability of data (Shane, 2004). 
Statistically, the size of our population of SO is quite significant (not far from 40%) and well above the 
current sample size of empirical analyses on a national context and in line with most empirical investigations 
on the SO phenomenon27. Nevertheless, our analysis relied on data covered on a given time period: the SO 
phenomenon has attracted the attention of researchers and policy makers only in recent years. The 
questionnaire survey was undertaken in 2008 (January-June) and, accordingly, 2007 was the first year for 
which it has been possible to have complete data from Aida data bank. Furthermore, the analysis is focused 
on the Italian case without comparisons with the same context in other countries, but, given the inspiring 
results of this survey, this will be an interesting insight for future research. Similarly, in case of data 
availability, the role of venture capital and “non”-traditional partnerships could be an issue for further 
research. 
Our analysis revealed that SO development displays similar figures with or without a TIP. What does 
this mean for SO? These are a particular kind of firm, characterized by a small size as well as management 
and finance gaps, but with a very strong scientific knowledge background. They need to strengthen their 
structure not only in order to foster in the best way the potentialities developed in the parent institute but also 
to grow. To this goal, we cannot take for granted that a TIP could be the best solution. Furthermore, aids 
from a TIP and from an external manager are not considered by SO themselves as key solutions: a self-
training propensity as well as a perception of no lack of managerial competence emerged. The main issue we 
developed in the paper is that facing the need for missing managerial and industrial resources, SO should 
simply look for “non”-traditional industrial partners. And in fact SO did not demonstrate to be specifically 
looking for TIP. This result suggests they rather should be encouraged to explore complementary solutions 
like the embeddedness in a set of industrial relations between SO themselves, constituting a virtual industrial 
cluster providing similar strategic assets and resources for development and performance. This set and 
network of industrial relations may be interpreted as what the literature calls “BES” either they are physical 
or digital. The development of the business ecosystem concept in the literature remains very general 
(descriptive) and highlights different contexts and ways to characterize it. It is therefore very difficult to 
apply it on a concrete way considering more general SMEs and SO. Nonetheless, it provides interesting 
insights to be taken into consideration. Academic distant networks and virtual industrial clusters like BES 
can be applied “in practice” if and only if a real willingness of focusing on this phenomenon and establishing 
a common framework for setting up standard conditions for SO emerges at European level. As highlighted 
by Moore (2003, p. 1), “like individual plants or animals, individual businesses cannot thrive alone – they 
must develop in clusters or economic ecosystems”. Therefore, we suggest to help SO not only “to go digital” 
(European Commission, 2001), but also to develop in “BES” as a means of safeguarding their autonomy and 
                                                 
26On this topic see among others: Rothaermel, Thursby, 2005; Clarysse et al., 2007; Squicciarini, 2008; Schwartz, 2009; 
Fini et al., 2009; Clarysse et al., 2011. 
27See, for example, Mustar, 1997; Steffensen et al., 1999; Clarysse et al., 2007;Gupte, 2007; D’Este, Perkmann, 2011. 
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fostering their knowledge potential. To this aim, a central role should be undertaken by universities, science 
parks and incubators. 
Few relations have been made, since now, between traditional clusters (Porter, 2000) and more 
distributed BES, either physical or digital, in particular considering SMEs and SO. Nonetheless, as 
highlighted by Corallo et al. (2007, p. 11) “small firms belonging to industrial districts are growing globally, 
creating loosely coupled networks of firms” and they are an example of natural ecosystems. According to 
Iansiti and Levien (2004, p. 70-72), “the analogy between business networks and biological ecosystems can 
aid this understanding by vividly highlighting certain pivotal concepts”. Nevertheless, “ecosystems are still 
poorly understood and even more poorly managed”. We went beyond this analogy in order to suggest a 
solution aimed at safeguarding the strength of this kind of firms and reducing their weaknesses when the 
“knowledge” component meets the rules of the market. The empirical analysis results (i.e. the lack of 
significant differences between SOwithTIP and SOwithoutTIP development and performance) confirmed the 
usefulness of this new way of thinking in order to improve the SO performance. 
In conclusion, we can recall that the importance and the role played in general by SMEs are well 
known. In this context, SO are a particular kind of firm. Their very nature, emerging from scientific and 
research development, make them characterised by an independence attitude as well as a lack of managerial 
and business competence; they could build – thanks to BES – specific solutions to complete their industrial 
needs and to support their development. If we want to assure their growth and development and not only 
their survival, we need to foster all the actors involved in SO policies to work together in order to avoid 
individual initiatives and to favour common improvements for “knowledge” valorisation at “country” level. 
A renewed interest at the EU level not only in general for “(digital) BES” but also in particular for an 
application of this concept at the community of SO could help to achieve this goal.       
 
Appendix: 
Table 12: Descriptive Statistics: total sample 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Added Value 2007 98 124040.6 322388.6     -480349     2134616 
Total assets 2007 98 466208.2     844899.6       11459 4124147 
Time   98 2.744898     2.714266           0 12 
 
Table 13: Descriptive Statistics: SOwithTIP (flagspin-off=1) 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Added Value 2007 38 169355.2     401608.1     -455639     2134616 
Total assets 2007 38 545060.8     982776.8       11459 3522320 
Time   38 2.552632     2.606617           0 11 
 
Table 14: Descriptive Statistics: SOwithoutTIP (flagspin-off=0) 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Added Value 2007 60 95341.4     259937.9     -480349     1272073 
Total assets 2007 60 416268.3       749255 12389 4124147 
Time   60 2.866667     2.795072           0 12 
 
Table 15: Correlation Matrix 
(obs=98) Added Value 2007 Total assets 2007 Time 
Added Value 2007 1.0000   
 27 
Total assets 2007 0.6621 1.0000  
Time 0.5065 0.4957 1.0000 
 
Model 1 
Linear regression       Number of obs =     98 
        F(  10,   87)   =     7.72 
        Prob> F        =   0.0000 
        R-squared      =   0.5430 
        Root MSE      =  2.3e+05 
 
Added Value 2007 Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Total assets 2007  .2377994    .0813392      2.92         0.004*** .0761289     .3994699 
Time  27681.14       15847.1      1.75      0.084* -3816.696     59178.97 
Company  252019.8    257263.5      0.98    0.330 -259319.2     763358.8 
North  20952.83    52249.92      0.40     0.689 -82899.54     124805.2 
Centre    17830.3    49324.15      0.36    0.719 -80206.79     115867.4 
South and Islands (dropped)      
Transport   (dropped)      
ICT -86598.89    54830.62     -1.58    0.118 -195580.7        22382.9 
Biopharmaceutical -11918.36    43706.21     -0.27    0.786 -98789.19     74952.47 
Engineering  58973.07    106482.7       0.55    0.581 -152672.8          270619 
Other  31996.75    61254.19      0.52    0.603 -89752.58     153746.1 
Flagspinoff  47909.24    47022.57      1.02     0.311   -45553.2     141371.7 
Constant -313209.8    273048.4     -1.15    0.254    -855923     229503.4 
*** Significant at 1% statistical level 
** Significant at 5% statistical level 
* Significant at 10% statistical level 
 
Table 16: Variance Inflation Factor 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Biopharmaceutical 4.10 0.243841 
ICT 4.00 0.249736 
Engineering 2.92 0.342646 
Centre 1.95 0.512359 
North 1.95 0.513431 
Total assets 2007 1.57 0.635408 
Other 1.56 0.641031 
Time 1.44 0.692644 
Company 1.27 0.787964 
Flagspinoff 1.08 0.929129 
Mean VIF 2.18  
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